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Dossier · ExplainerSecurityUpdated Q4 2026 ·

Which Post-Quantum Cryptography Deadlines Apply in the US, EU and UK?

First version 3 min7/7 facts confirmed

The United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom have each set official deadlines for moving off quantum-vulnerable cryptography, according to NIST, the European Commission and the NCSC. All three share the same shape, with the most sensitive systems moving first, around 2030 to 2031, and the rest following by 2035. An earlier explainer on this site looked at what drives the migration, and when a quantum computer could realistically break today’s encryption.

Why these deadlines exist

RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, the algorithms these deadlines target, rely on mathematical problems that are hard today, according to Wikipedia. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could solve those problems, integer factorisation and the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm, in polynomial time. No such machine exists yet, but the deadlines are not only about the day one arrives. Data encrypted with these algorithms today can already be intercepted and stored, then decrypted retroactively once that machine exists, a risk known as harvest-now-decrypt-later.

United States: NIST sets 2030 and 2035

The US National Institute of Standards and Technology published the final version of NIST IR 8547, “Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards,” on 27 October 2026. It deprecates every quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithm, including RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography regardless of key size, after 2030, and disallows their use under NIST standards after 2035.

Federal systems classed as “high value assets” or “high impact” move on a tighter schedule, according to NIST. They must adopt post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030, and post-quantum digital signatures by 31 December 2031. That tighter pace sits inside the broader federal migration deadline of 2035 set earlier by the US policy document NSM-10.

The final standard is also stricter than NIST’s own November 2024 draft on one widely used curve, according to NIST. The draft had kept 128-bit parameter sets such as P-256 and RSA-3072 usable until disallowal after 2035. The final version instead deprecates P-256 after 2030, the same date as the weaker RSA-2048 and P-224.

European Union: a roadmap with three milestones

On 23 June 2025, the EU PQC Workstream set out a coordinated roadmap for the transition to post-quantum cryptography, with three milestones. By 31 December 2026, every member state must have a national transition strategy ready. By 31 December 2030, high-risk use cases must be migrated. By 31 December 2035, migration of the rest should be completed as far as possible, and vulnerable key mechanisms may no longer be used on their own.

That roadmap builds on an earlier step, according to the European Commission. A Commission Recommendation adopted on 11 April 2024 first called on member states to prepare national transition plans.

United Kingdom: three phases to 2035

The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre followed on 20 March 2025 with its own three-phase roadmap. By 2028, organisations should identify which of their cryptographic services need upgrading and build a migration plan. Between 2028 and 2031, they should carry out high-priority upgrades and refine their plans as post-quantum cryptography evolves. Between 2031 and 2035, they should complete migration for all systems, services and products.

The deadlines compared

Jurisdiction Body High-risk / federal systems Full migration
United States NIST Key establishment by 2030, signatures by 2031 for high-value federal systems. Vulnerable algorithms deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035.
European Union European Commission High-risk use cases migrated by 2030. Completed as far as possible by 2035.
United Kingdom NCSC High-priority upgrades between 2028 and 2031. All systems, services and products by 2035.

None of the three deadlines require organisations to have finished migrating today. Each sets 2030 or 2031 as the point by which the most sensitive systems must have moved, and 2035 as the point by which the rest should follow.

Sources

  1. [1]NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards NIST
  2. [2]Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Europese Commissie en Quantum Flagship
  3. [3]PQC migration roadmap unveiled National Cyber Security Centre (UK)
  4. [4]Post-quantum cryptography Wikipedia EN/NL
MethodologyHow this article was made
Facts confirmed
7 / 7
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Last checked
Nov 4, 2026
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This article was written by an AI system from facts in international trade media, publications by companies and research institutes and public sources, with the source for every fact, and checked under our methodology. The byline is an editorial pseudonym. Found an error? Report it through the contact page.

Facts used

  1. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology published the final version of NIST IR 8547, "Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards," on 27 October 2026. It states that every quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithm, including RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography regardless of key size, is deprecated after 2030 and disallowed under NIST standards after 2035. NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (final, October 2026) · Nov 4, 2026
  2. NIST IR 8547 sets a tighter pace for the most sensitive US federal systems. Federal "high value assets" and "high impact" systems must move to post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030, and to post-quantum digital signatures by 31 December 2031. That timeline follows the earlier US policy document NSM-10, which set 2035 as the general deadline for the federal migration. NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (final, October 2026) · Nov 4, 2026
  3. Between the November 2024 draft of NIST IR 8547 and its final October 2026 version, NIST tightened the schedule for one widely used curve. The draft kept 128-bit parameter sets such as P-256 and RSA-3072 acceptable until disallowal after 2035, but the final version deprecates P-256 after 2030, on the same date as the weaker RSA-2048 and P-224. NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (final, October 2026) · Nov 4, 2026
  4. The European Commission's EU PQC Workstream published its coordinated roadmap for the transition to post-quantum cryptography on 23 June 2025, setting three milestones. By 31 December 2026, every EU member state must have a national transition strategy ready; by 31 December 2030, high-risk use cases must be migrated; by 31 December 2035, migration of the rest should be completed as far as possible and vulnerable key mechanisms may no longer be used on their own. EU PQC Workstream, A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography · Nov 4, 2026
  5. The EU's coordinated roadmap builds on an earlier Commission Recommendation on a Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to post-quantum cryptography, adopted on 11 April 2024, which first called on member states to prepare national transition plans. European Commission, Recommendation on a Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography · Nov 4, 2026
  6. The UK's National Cyber Security Centre published a three-phase roadmap for migrating to post-quantum cryptography on 20 March 2025. By 2028, organisations should identify which cryptographic services need upgrading and build a migration plan; between 2028 and 2031, they should carry out high-priority upgrades and refine their plans as post-quantum cryptography evolves; between 2031 and 2035, they should complete migration to post-quantum cryptography for all systems, services and products. NCSC, PQC migration roadmap unveiled · Nov 4, 2026
  7. RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, the public-key systems these deadlines target, rely on problems (integer factorisation and the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm) that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer running Shor's algorithm could solve in polynomial time. The urgency behind the deadlines comes from what is called harvest-now-decrypt-later: data encrypted with these algorithms today can be intercepted and stored, then decrypted retroactively once such a quantum computer exists, even though none exists yet. Wikipedia, Post-quantum cryptography (revision 1381497031, 22 October 2026) · Nov 4, 2026