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Dossier · ExplainerSecurityUpdated Q4 2026 ·

What Is "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later", and Which Data Is at Risk?

First version 4 min8/8 facts confirmed

NIST’s final report IR 8547, published on 27 October 2026, deprecates every quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithm, including RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, after 2030, according to NIST. NIST disallows their use under its own standards after 2035. That cut-off exists because adversaries are not waiting for a quantum computer to arrive before they start collecting; they are stockpiling encrypted traffic now, against the day one does.

Why today’s encryption is tomorrow’s problem

Security agencies call this strategy harvest now, decrypt later, according to Wikipedia. An adversary stores data it cannot read today, in the hope that a future quantum computer will let it decrypt that data years from now. It is also called store now decrypt later, steal now decrypt later or retrospective decryption. It only pays off if a powerful quantum computer able to run Shor’s algorithm is eventually built, according to Wikipedia. That algorithm can break the RSA and elliptic-curve encryption that protects most of today’s internet traffic. The hypothetical moment a quantum computer becomes powerful enough to run that attack is nicknamed “Q-Day”, with the related term “Y2Q” drawing a deliberate analogy to the Y2K date-change scare. Nobody has to wait for Q-Day to start harvesting. An adversary can intercept and archive encrypted traffic now, while it is still unreadable, and hold it until a capable machine exists.

That makes the strategy most dangerous for data with a long confidentiality lifetime, meaning it has to stay secret for years or decades, according to Wikipedia. Named examples are diplomatic communications, personal health records, critical-infrastructure logs and intellectual property: worthless to an eavesdropper today, valuable once it can be decrypted. Data that only needs to stay confidential for days or weeks carries far less of this risk, since it will likely have lost its value long before any quantum computer arrives.

A warning repeated for half a decade

According to Wikipedia, the European Data Protection Supervisor wrote about the quantum threat to cryptography in 2020. The UK’s National Quantum Technologies Programme published “Quantum-Safe Secure Communications” in 2021. The US federal government proposed its migration roadmap in 2022, and CISA, the NSA and NIST jointly published quantum-readiness guidance in 2023. Germany’s BSI and the US Federal Reserve each published their own assessment of the risk in 2025.

The main defence, and a narrower one

The main defence against harvest now, decrypt later is migrating encryption to post-quantum cryptography (PQC): algorithms believed to resist attack even from a quantum computer, according to Wikipedia. A narrower, complementary technique is physical-layer or optical-layer security. It alters the optical signal itself in fibre-optic links, so a standard receiver cannot record a usable copy of the transmission at all, denying the harvesting step rather than the later decryption.

Three bodies have turned that defence into dated schedules. NIST’s is the one above: new use of RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography deprecated after 2030, disallowed under its own standards after 2035. The NCSC sets a three-phase timeline for UK organisations, according to the NCSC. By 2028, they should identify which cryptographic services need upgrading and build a migration plan. By 2031, they should have carried out their highest-priority upgrades. By 2035, migration to post-quantum cryptography should be complete across all their systems, services and products. ENISA, the EU’s cybersecurity agency, states that quantum computing will be highly disruptive for current security equipment and cryptography. It directs its mitigation work at integrating post-quantum cryptography with the systems organisations already run, rather than waiting to replace them outright.

Deadlines side by side

Body What it has set
NIST (United States) New use of RSA and ECC deprecated after 2030, disallowed under NIST standards after 2035.
NCSC (United Kingdom) Migration plan by 2028, highest-priority upgrades by 2031, migration complete by 2035.
ENISA (EU) No fixed date; focuses on integrating PQC with existing cryptographic systems.

Every one of these deadlines sits years before most experts expect Q-Day itself. That is why NIST, the NCSC and ENISA all set migration work in motion now, rather than waiting for that moment to arrive. Two earlier explainers on this site cover related ground: one on expert timelines, and one on national migration deadlines.

Sources

  1. [1]Harvest now, decrypt later Wikipedia EN/NL
  2. [2]NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (final) NIST
  3. [3]Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography National Cyber Security Centre (UK)
  4. [4]Cryptography ENISA
MethodologyHow this article was made
Facts confirmed
8 / 8
Sources
4
Last checked
Nov 15, 2026
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This article was written by an AI system from facts in international trade media, publications by companies and research institutes and public sources, with the source for every fact, and checked under our methodology. The byline is an editorial pseudonym. Found an error? Report it through the contact page.

Facts used

  1. Harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL), also called store now decrypt later, steal now decrypt later or retrospective decryption, is a surveillance strategy in which an adversary acquires and stores currently unreadable encrypted data for the long term, waiting for a future breakthrough in decryption technology, most commonly a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, that would let it read that data later even though it cannot read it today. Wikipedia, Harvest now, decrypt later (revision 1381300496, 21 October 2026) · Nov 15, 2026
  2. The strategy only pays off if a large, fault-tolerant quantum computer capable of running Shor's algorithm is eventually built, since that algorithm can break the RSA and elliptic-curve encryption that protects most of today's internet traffic. That hypothetical future moment is nicknamed "Q-Day", with the related term "Y2Q" drawing a deliberate analogy to the Y2K date-change scare. Wikipedia, Harvest now, decrypt later (revision 1381300496, 21 October 2026) · Nov 15, 2026
  3. The strategy is most dangerous for data with a long confidentiality lifetime, meaning it still has to stay secret years or decades after it was sent. Named examples are diplomatic communications, personal health records, critical-infrastructure logs and intellectual property: traffic an adversary can capture and archive now in encrypted form, worthless today, valuable once it can be decrypted. Wikipedia, Harvest now, decrypt later (revision 1381300496, 21 October 2026) · Nov 15, 2026
  4. Warnings about the strategy span several years and agencies: the European Data Protection Supervisor wrote about the quantum threat to cryptography in 2020, the UK's National Quantum Technologies Programme published "Quantum-Safe Secure Communications" in 2021, the US federal government proposed its migration roadmap in 2022, and CISA, the NSA and NIST jointly published quantum-readiness guidance in 2023. Germany's BSI and the US Federal Reserve both published their own assessments of the risk in 2025. Wikipedia, Harvest now, decrypt later (revision 1381300496, 21 October 2026) · Nov 15, 2026
  5. The main defence against harvest now, decrypt later is migrating encryption to post-quantum cryptography (PQC): algorithms believed to resist attack even from a quantum computer. A narrower, complementary technique is physical-layer or optical-layer security, which alters the optical signal itself in fibre-optic links so that a standard receiver cannot record a usable copy of the transmission at all, denying the harvesting step rather than the later decryption. Wikipedia, Harvest now, decrypt later (revision 1381300496, 21 October 2026) · Nov 15, 2026
  6. NIST's response to the harvest-now risk is a fixed cut-off for the vulnerable algorithms being harvested against: its final NIST IR 8547, "Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards" (27 October 2026), deprecates every quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithm, including RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography at any key size, after 2030, and disallows their use under NIST standards after 2035, so that encrypted data created after those dates can no longer rely on algorithms a future quantum computer could break. NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (final, October 2026) · Nov 15, 2026
  7. The UK's National Cyber Security Centre frames the same urgency as a three-phase migration timeline: by 2028, organisations should identify which of their cryptographic services need upgrading and build a migration plan; by 2031, they should have carried out their highest-priority post-quantum upgrades; by 2035, migration to post-quantum cryptography should be complete across all their systems, services and products, closing the window in which new data is still exposed to harvesting. NCSC, Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography · Nov 15, 2026
  8. ENISA, the EU's cybersecurity agency, states that quantum computing will be highly disruptive for current security equipment and cryptography, and directs its mitigation work at integrating post-quantum cryptography with the cryptographic systems organisations already run, rather than waiting to replace them outright, so that the transition away from harvestable encryption can start before a quantum computer able to break it exists. ENISA, Cryptography · Nov 15, 2026